Winter 1781
The end of 1780 was near as Marion took refuge in his winter quarters on Snow's Island, I am sure it seemed to him to be a lifetime ago when he started his gig as the leader of the militia in this area of SC even though it was only four months ago. I am sure it was a quick time of reflection that gave him some hope to preserve the "cause" to have at least some better communication with the Continental Southern Army's leader Greene.
At the start, it almost seemed like Greene needed Marion verses the other way around. Greene wanted intel, horses, corn, rice and even Negroes. While Marion in return would get ammo .. he eventually received even better resources.
1) Marion proceeds to have John Postell collect fifty Negroes from enemy area above Georgetown "taking care not to distress any family, but taking them where they can best be spared" and deliver them up the Pee Dee River at the NC/SC border where Greene was in winter quarters. Greene had moved here from Charlotte since this area had a more fertile forage area.
2) Greene pushed to ensure timely intel arrived regarding British reinforcements headed toward Cornwallis' winter quarters in Winnsboro, SC that might threaten his army should Cornwallis proceed to invade NC. Greene made a move that goes against military strategy in that he split his already small force to allow 600 men under Daniel Morgan to get within striking distance of the British stronghold at Ninety-Six, SC. Part of this was the reality that he could not feed all the men he had at the winter quarters. This forced Cornwallis to split up his force by detaching Tarleton to defend Ninety-Six and he had to stay put in case Greene's force combined with Marion's might threaten his force, at least until reinforcements (under Gen. Alexander Leslie) arrived. Cornwallis knew that he had to drive Greene from NC to stabilize SC.
a) Marion came through on intel and in late Dec 1780 confirmed that Leslie arrived in Charleston and estimated his force at just under 2000 (was actually closer to 1500). Marion also came though in alerting Greene when Leslie started moving to the interior of SC.
b) Marion also was directed to harass the enemy, which was a challenge since his men were spread thin already by their intel role. Marion dispatched Peter Horry to the Waccamaw Nech region near Georgetown where rice was picked up and cattle driven off.
3) Greene's appetite for horses almost harmed this regular / militia partnership. Greene realized that the fight in the south meant traversing deep rivers (horses swim better than most men, so horses helped) and and moving in and around impassible creeks/swamps. Greene was a quick study using maps to understand the geography and in weeks he knew more than Cornwallis did in half a year.
a) Marion would sometimes not reply directly to the request for horses since he had none to spare, His own men, who routinely had 3-4 rounds of ammo needed the horses in their hit-n-run style. His men were also farmers, and horses were essential to a good working farm. Greene would remind Marion and would drop the exiled SC governor's name (Rutledge) to force the issue and even ask how many Marion had and how many he could spare. Marion's men, unpaid volunteers, giving their horses to an army that was supplied by the Continental Congress? Some of Marion's men deserted him when they learned of this.
b) Marion's cavalry tactic meant that the British could never force a decisive action on the militia. Even with bird shot, effective at only 20-30 yards, Marion's men could effectively harass the British. In time Greene admitted that taking horses from the militia was like robbing Peter to pay Paul, so eventually he got the message.
4) By January 14 Marion thanked Greene for a shipment of ammo and also addressed the need for some reinforcements as the Tories near the NC border were joining forces with other Tories around Georgetown. Within about a week (delayed because of difficulty in finding the Swamp Fox) a detachment of 250 men (mix of cavalry and infantry) led by Lt. Col. "Light-Horse" Harry Lee age 25 (father of Robert E. Lee).
a) Light-horse Harry was different in some ways from Marion, a highly educated Virginia gentleman who dressed elegantly and had his men in full uniform with short green coats (similar to Tarleton's on the British side). This color accent hampered his ability to find Marion as the locals were very suspect of the green!
b) Light-horse Harry also was an egotist, a self-promoter unlike Marion BUT similar to Francis with being small in stature as well. Both were believers in discipline, agility and speed.
c) Light-horse Harry would eventually tout his own achievements in his memoirs while settling scores with his enemies including Thomas Jefferson. But in the end, Harry would speak fondly of Francis Marion even though in his reports he used "I" where he should have used "we".
5) January 23rd found these two leaders bringing their forces to bear on Georgetown in an amphibious assault (by land and sea), however, delays in the land portion led to a premature attack from the sea the morning of the 25th. The garrison's commander and four others were captured and then paroled but the element of surprise was gone and the taking of Georgetown would not be that day. Both commanders erred toward preserving their men's live than achieving a bloody victory. The psychological impact was there as the British held back resources to protect Georgetown which as a supplier of salt in the region as well as a transportation crossroads. The Continentals and militia also saw positive traits in each other that would help toward future operations together.
6) Returning to their camps it was communicated that on January 17th, Daniel Morgan achieved a double pincer movement at Cowpens, SC that utilized militia in the front lines to supply 2-3 volleys and then retreat which brought Tarleton's dragoons into a trap (remember that from the movie The Patriot?) and resulting of 85% loss in the dragoon's 1050 man force (100 dead, 230 wounded and 600 captured). Also captured was two field cannon, 800 muskets and 100 horses.
7) On the heels of this, Cornwallis, having lost 25% of his force proceeded to chase Morgan and Greene. These two commanders headed towards VA for supplies and reinforcements. Cornwallis with Gen Alexander Leslie's 1500 men would burn their supply train including the rum and chase Greene throughout NC. By January 31st, even Light-horse Harry Lee was ordered to join Greene in the race to the Dan River at the NC/VA border.
a) Militia recruiting dropped again as the Whigs in the area, knowing the Continental Army had left the lower south, became concerned for their lives and their farms once more.
b) Marion was able to inflict some more damage as he was now alone in this theater of operation by sending Postell and 25 men to Wadboo Bridge and Monck's Corner to burn British supplies there and he even warned about not sparing the burning of the rum they would find. Pretty sure the men, having been off the rum for five months took this opportunity to reward themselves.
8) February 11th marked the day that Greene's letter would inform Marion that Thomas Sumter (Gamecock) was back in action and that Marion would be reporting to him. This did not sit well with the Swamp Fox, but in the end, he respected the chain of command. Thomas Sumter, however, a champion of "states rights" before it was cool actually sat out with his men at the battle of Cowpens. In his mind, he believed he was only accountable to the SC governor in exile, Rutledge. Sumter would follow an order from the Continental Army only if he agreed with it.
NOTE: What would you do? State's Rights OR the emerging Federation's priorities?
Next chapter is titled "Hound and Fox" and the following "Fox and Hound" ... this back and forth would be typical in the Spring of 1781 in South Carolina as the war in the South continue to rage while in the North there was a stalemate.
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